Recent capital structure theories have emphasized the role of debt in minimizing the agency costs that arise from the separation between ownership and control. In this paper we argue that capital structure choices themselves are a ected by the same agency problem. We show that, in general, the shareholders' and the manager's capital structure choices di er not only in their levels, but also in their sensitivities to the cost of nancial distress and taxes. We argue that only the managerial perspective can explain why rms are generally reluctant to issue equity, w h y they issue it only following a stock price run-up, and why Corporate America recently deleveraged under the same tax system that supposedly generated the increase in leverage in the 1980s.
Recent capital structure theories (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1982) , Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , and Hart and Moore (1995) ) have emphasized the role played by debt in reducing agency con icts between managers and shareholders. Debt increases e ciency because it prevents managers from nancing unpro table projects. At the same time, debt may also block some pro table investment opportunities. The optimal capital structure, then, represents the ex ante e cient trade o between these costs and bene ts.
These theories, though, leave unresolved the issue of who will choose such an optimal capital structure. They emphasize the role of debt in reducing agency problems between managers and shareholders, but they ignore that the choice of debt itself is subject to an agency problem. Short of claiming that the optimal capital structure is designed once and for all by the initial founders, these theories have to rely on self-interested managers to implement the optimal nancing decisions. This fact raises two questions. First, how can we expect a manager to voluntarily increase the rm's leverage to decrease her own discretion? Second, even admitting that managers might be forced to use debt, why should we expect their choices to coincide with the ex ante optimal ones?
The rst question has been addressed by Harris and Raviv (1988) , Stulz (1988) , and especially Zwiebel (1992) . All these papers show h o w a t a k eover threat forces a manager to increase leverage. In particular, Zwiebel (1992) shows this might happen even if the takeover pressure is permanent. However, none of these studies analyze the possible divergence between a manager's choice under a takeover threat and the ex ante optimal capital structure. Hart and Moore (1995) conjecture that \the thrust of our analysis applies also to the case where management c hooses nancial structure to maximize its own welfare". The purpose of this paper is to illumine the conditions under which this claim could fail, and to investigate the sources and the implications of such a divergence between the two notions of optimality.
To a c hieve this objective w e build a model which j o i n tly considers the two main disciplinary mechanisms: debt and the corporate control market. In this framework, we d e r i v e the optimal capital structure both from a manager's and from a shareholders' point of view.
Our characterization of the shareholders' point of view is of independent i n terest, because, unlike existing models which analyze the ex ante choice of debt as a discipline device, we explicitly model the e ects of debt not only on the likelihood of bankruptcy but also on the likelihood of a takeover.
Our characterization of the managers' point of view is similar to Zwiebel (1992) , in that a manager maximizes her job tenure, which is threatened by t wo possible events: bankruptcy and takeovers. The occurrence of both these events is a ected by the capital structure in place. In our model, though, the manager realizes that the use of debt may c r o wd out the e ectiveness of takeovers and uses this crowding out e ect in a way that maximizes her own entrenchment. This creates a distortion in the manager's capital structure choice.
We show that, in general, the shareholders and the manager's capital structure choices di er. Depending on a company's relative performance and on the pressure from the corporate control market, the manager may underlever or overlever her company with respect to the ex ante optimal shareholders' choice. More importantly, the two c hoices di er not only in their levels, but also in their sensitivities to the cost of nancial distress and taxes. For instance, while the e ciency approach has standard predictions on the e ects of taxes, the entrenchment approach predicts an asymmetric and variable sensitivity of capital structure choice to tax incentives. In sum, in a world where managers control capital structure decisions, Hart and Moore's (1995) conjecture does not necessarily hold.
Our questioning of this conjecture highlights the importance of examining the capital structure decisions from a manager's perspective. This perspective w as strongly advocated by Donaldson (1969) more than twenty v e y ears ago, but its full implications have n e v er been worked out. It has generally been identi ed with the simple idea that managers underlever their companies for fear of the personal costs of bankruptcy. This risk aversion explanation, however, is far from satisfactory. It cannot explain why risk-averse managers are reluctant t o issue equity and why the same risk-averse managers who generally underlever their companies chose to undertake major leverage recapitalizations in the 1980s.
By contrast, our paper fully develops the entrenchment approach as an alternative w ay to look at capital structure decisions. We show that our formulation of the entrenchment approach is able to explain why and when managers are reluctant to issue equity. At t h e same time, it provides further and novel insights on other dimensions of the capital structure decisions, like the choice between public and private debt and the choice of debt covenants. Finally, this approach is able to explain the early 1990s deleverage of Corporate America under the same tax system that allegedly generated the increase in leverage in the late 1980s.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the basic structure of the model. Section 2 derives the ex ante optimal capital structure. Section 3 derives the optimal capital structure from a manager's point of view and compares it with the ex ante optimal. Section 4 describes how the manager's choice responds to tax subsidies for debt and equity. Section 5 presents some relevant extensions. Section 6 discusses the empirical implications of our model. Finally, section 7 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of a model based on managerial entrenchment.
General Framework
Our interest is to compare the capital structure decisions made by self interested managers with those that shareholders would make. Therefore, we consider a rm run by a manager whose interests are not perfectly aligned with shareholders. We model this con ict of interests by assuming that the manager wants to retain her control position, even when she is not the best person for the job. For simplicity, w e abstract from other sources of con icts of interest between managers and shareholders (like i n vestment policy or e ort) and focus only on the most radical version of it: who should run the rm. Let s 2 < n be a vector of attributes summarizing the incumbent manager's ability and let s ? be the optimal manager's type. Then we are interested in analyzing the cases where s 6 = s ? .
We restrict our analysis to one production period. The value of the rm at the end of this period consists of two factors. The rst one, y 1 ( ), captures the e ects on the rm's value of the uncertainty during the period. represents a productivity shock uniformly distributed over the interval 0 1]. To simplify our analysis we shall assume that the e ect of the productivity shock is linear, that is, y 1 ( ) = . The second component, y 2 (s), re ects the value of the rm as a function of the quality of the incumbent manager at the end of the period. Suppose that the rm is auctioned o with the incumbent manager. Then, y 2 (s) represents the \continuation value" of the rm if the s-type manager is still in place at the end of the period, while y 2 (s ? ) is the rm's value when the optimal manager has been put in place.
By assuming risk neutrality and a zero discount rate, the value of a rm where the type-s manager retains control is given by V (s) = E y 1 ( )] + y 2 (s):
By contrast, if before the end of the period the type-s manager is dismissed and replaced with the optimal manager, the value of the rm is V (s ? ) = E y 1 ( )] + y 2 (s ? ):
The incumbent manager can be unseated in two w ays: either the company e n ters bankruptcy and the manager is automatically dismissed, or shareholders coordinate to force the manager to step down. Regardless of how the incumbent manager is dismissed, we assume that the optimal type of manager is chosen to run the rm afterwards.
The working of the corporate control market
Shareholders are dispersed, therefore we assume that they can force the manager to step down only by p a ying a transaction cost c. The ring of the manager can be interpreted as a takeover, a proxy ght or some other form of shareholders' activism. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we shall call a \takeover" any corporate control initiative, and a \raider" the leader of the control initiative. Howeve r , i t i s w orth emphasizing that our framework is not restricted to the takeover case.
We assume that an ine cient manager is replaced if and only if it is pro table to do so, that is, S ? ; S c (1) where S ? is the company's equity v alue under the best possible manager and S is the company's equity v alue under the current management.
To decide whether to undertake a takeover, a raider must compare S ? ;S with c. W e assume that c is exogenous and known by the raider, the manager, and shareholders. Therefore, we focus on the increase in a target's equity v alue.
Note that equation (1) corresponds to assuming that shareholders cannot free ride on the improvement implemented by the raider. Moreover, we also assume that the market for corporate control is perfectly competitive. As a result, takeovers will be provided \at cost" whenever they are pro table. In practice, the corporate control market is probably not perfectly competitive, and takeovers may not occur even if they create value because the raider cannot appropriate enough of the takeover gains (see Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Therefore, our assumptions on the market for corporate control are not chosen for realism, but to emphasize that distortions in capital structure choices arise even in this idealized world. As we shall show in section 5, introducing more realistic features in the working of the corporate control market will only strengthen our results.
If the capital structure is such that there is no probability of default, then the left hand side of equation (1) 
The working of bankruptcy
If at the end of the period the value of the rm under the incumbent management falls below the face value of the debt, then the company defaults and creditors take control of the company. W e assume that in bankruptcy creditors replace the ine cient manager with the optimal one. 2 Unfortunately, default is not a costless disentrenchment device. If the company g o e s i n to bankruptcy, t h e n a f r a c t i o n 2 (0 1) of y 1 ( ) is lost. This is consistent with interpreting y 1 ( ) as the current c a s h o w and y 2 (s) as the continuation value. We also assume that G(s) < . The rst term captures the change in the rm's equity v alue when the incumbent cannot repay the debt. In these events, the company defaults and its value is reduced by the cost of nancial distress y 1 ( ). However, thanks to default, the incumbent is replaced and the \continuation" payo is then y 2 (s ? ).
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The second term shows the equity v alue when the company does not default and the manager stays in control.
If the incumbent manager is replaced by a t a k eover, then, e ciency is enhanced and, under the same debt level, the set of bankruptcy states will skrink. Therefore, we can de ne ? D as the minimum value of such that default does not occur if the manager is replaced by a takeover. Formally, 
Subtracting (4) from (5) 
Equation (8) summarizes the three ways in which debt a ects the pro tability of a takeover. The rst term shows that an increase in debt (and so an increase in D ) reduces the pro tability of a takeover by delivering the replacement gains in the bankruptcy states. This is what we call the crowding out e ect of debt. The second term illustrates what was pointed out by Israel (1991) : the existence of risky debt transfers some of the takeover gains from the raider to the target debtholders. This e ect has been shown to be empirically relevant b y Billet (1995) . Note that these two e ects create a potential con ict of interests between the manager and shareholders in the choice of the optimal level of debt. Because the manager is interested in minimizing the probability of being replaced, she might ine ciently increase debt to use these two e ects to decrease the pro tability o f a t a k eover.
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The third e ect is the increase in equity v alue that comes with the lower probability o f bankruptcy. By increasing e ciency, the raider reduces the probability of bankruptcy, and hence, saves part of the expected cost of nancial distress. However, debtholders may bear some of the expected cost of nancial distress. As a consequence, the last term of equation (8) is not the entire reduction in the expected cost of nancial distress, but only the reduction that would be borne by equityholders.
For future reference it is useful to establish the following result:
Lemma 1 The equity gain from a takeover, S(D), i s d e creasing in D, with strict monotonicity for debt levels that the raider can pay with positive probability.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Lemma 1 simply states that the equityholders stand to gain less from a takeover as the face value of debt increases. In other words, the rst two (negative) e ects of debt on the pro tability o f a t a k eover overcome the third one.
1.4 The timing of the events Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events and the payo s in our model. At time 0 the capital structure is chosen either by the initial shareholders or by the incumbent manager. Whenever debt is issued, the proceeds are distributed to shareholders as dividends. If a takeover remains pro table after the change in the capital structure, then a raider takes over at time 1 and 7 Here we implicitly assumed that the existing debt cannot be renegotiated. Otherwise, the raider and the creditors should enter in an agreement to reduce the face value of the debt to an amount that allows the value enhancing takeover. However, the manager can make it di cult for a raider to renegotiate the company's debt by c hoosing public debt over private debt. Indeed, as we shall show in section 6.3, under a takeover pressure, the manager has the incentive t o m a k e a n y debt renegotiation more di cult. the manager is replaced. Otherwise, the manager remains in power at least until time 2. At this time, the industry-wide shock occurs, a ecting the nal payo through y 1 ( ). At t i m e 3 the nal payo s are realized and the debt becomes due. If the company defaults, then the incumbent manager is replaced and the \continuation payo " is y 2 (s ? ). Otherwise, the original manager stays in control and the \continuation payo " is y 2 (s). In this section we compute the capital structure that initial shareholders would like t o c hoose had they had the power and the ability to do so. In particular, we assume that they perfectly anticipate the type of manager who will be running the company in the future. In this context, one can think of the shareholders' capital structure decision as being a choice of the least expensive w ay of replacing ine cient managers: bankruptcy, t a k eover or a combination of the two. We start by assuming that bankruptcy is the only disentrenchment device available, and we later move to the case in which takeovers are possible. Initial shareholders internalize all the costs and bene ts of debt. Therefore, they choose the value of debt in order to maximize the rm's value:
where we used the fact that y 1 ( ) = . The rst integral is the rm's expected value conditioned on default. Default triggers the replacement of the management with the consequent g a i n G(s), but it also costs the rm some nancial distress ( ). The second integral is the value of the rm when there is no default. The necessary condition (which in this case is also su cient) for an interior maximum is G(s) ; D = 0 : It follows that the optimal level of debt triggers bankruptcy in all the states where G(s) > (that is the marginal replacement gain is larger than the marginal cost of nancial distress).
Note that if G(s)
then the optimal level of debt will induce bankruptcy with probability one. This is why w e restricted our analysis to the more interesting case where G(s) < .
It then follows
Lemma 2 The ex ante optimal debt level in the absence of takeovers is
Although our framework of analysis is somewhat di erent, D o corresponds to the results obtained by Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) . Consistent with them, the optimal debt does not fully eliminate all agency costs. In fact, when G(s) the ine cient manager remains in charge and this implies that shareholders will not receive G(s). Furthermore, even when the manager is replaced, the company has to incur some cost of nancial distress. We summarize the expected cost of using debt as a disentrenchment strategy as
Note that C D includes both the direct cost of nancial distress ( rst term) and the opportunity cost of not replacing the manager in some states of nature (second term). Let's now see how the optimal debt changes when we i n troduce the possibility o f t a k eovers.
If G(s) < c , then there is no change because takeovers are unpro table, and so they are not a viable alternative. Consider G(s) c. In this case takeovers are pro table in the absence of debt. Thus, initial shareholders have to decide whether they want to rely on takeovers, debt, or a combination of the two to disentrench the manager. However, because there is no uncertainty about the gains and costs of a takeover, the cost of takeovers will be either less than the expected cost of debt, wherein debt is unnecessary, or larger than the expected cost of debt, wherein shareholders should use debt to discipline the manager. Since there is no doubt ex ante as to which method has the lower expected cost, and since allowing takeovers eliminates any role for debt, it will always be optimal to use one method or the other, but never both in combination. Therefore, we can think of the shareholders' problem as a choice between using only debt or only takeovers to replace the manager. If they choose debt as the disentrenchment device, there is no reason for not using it in an optimal way (i.e., D = D o ). Hence, the solution of the shareholders' problem boils down to comparing C D o (i.e., C D computed at the optimal debt level D o ) with the takeover cost c. If C D o c, then takeovers are more e cient than bankruptcy in replacing the manager.
In this case the initial shareholders would like to minimize their interference with the working of the corporate control market. As a result, they choose any l e v el of debt that does not block a t a k eover and which n e v er forces the raider into bankruptcy. Proof: See Appendix. 2
As expected, the shareholders' optimal debt decreases with the cost of nancial distress. This happens because the increase in the relative cost of an instrument (in this case debt) induces initial shareholders to use less of it. The same intuition applies to the comparative static with respect to c. An increase in the cost of takeovers induces a substitution towards debt as a disentrenchment device. The third result is only slightly less straightforward. The total cost of debt C D is composed of a combination of the cost of nancial distress and the opportunity cost of not replacing the manager. An increase in the replacement gain will push the optimal debt to a higher level to ensure that the higher replacement gain is lost in fewer states of nature.
The Manager's Capital Structure Choice
The manager's objective is to maximize her tenure. Thus, she minimizes the probability o f being replaced either by a takeover or by creditors in default. This corresponds to minimizing the probability of bankruptcy conditioned on surviving the takeover threat. The objective function is the probability of bankruptcy for debt level D. Equation (12) represents the main constraint on the manager's choice: a takeover must be unpro table at the optimal debt level. The manager's problem is very simple to solve when there is no real takeover pressure, that is, G(s) < c . I n s u c h case, an optimal debt level from the manager's point of view simply minimizes the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, any debt that the company c a n p a y with probability 1 under the incumbent is optimal. Formally,
Solving the manager's problem is not so easy when the manager is under a real takeover pressure. Here, blocking a takeover requires some risk of bankruptcy. In principle, one might conjecture that debt cannot block t a k eovers when the replacement g a i n i s v ery high or the takeover cost is very low. However, Lemma 3 below s h o ws that there is always a su ciently large debt that blocks a takeover.
Lemma 3 The managers can always block a takeover by choosing a debt level equal to D = 1 + y 2 (s ? ):
This level of debt guarantees that the value of equity will always be zero, even after a takeover. As a result, S( D) < c . H o wever, D also leads the incumbent i n to bankruptcy with probability one. Therefore, before opting to such an extremely high leverage the incumbent manager would be interested in checking if the takeover can be blocked by a debt level that she can pay in some state of nature.
De ne D r as the set of risky debt levels that the incumbent c a n p a y in some state of nature. It is easy to see that D r is the interval (y 2 (s) 1 + y 2 (s)]. If S(D) < c for some D in D r , then 1 + y 2 (s ? ) cannot be optimal because there is another debt, that the incumbent can pay in some state of nature, which also blocks the takeover. In this case the optimal debt level is D m m + y 2 (s), where D m is the minimum debt in D r that satis es S(D) < c . 9 Technically, the minimum debt level in D r that satis es S(D) < c might not exist because the set Finally, i f S(D) c for any D 2 D r , then the manager will have to accept bankruptcy with probability 1 t o b l o c k t h e t a k eover. We do not gain any insight b y c haracterizing the set of debt levels that block the takeover at the cost of bankruptcy with probability 1 for the incumbent. Hence, in this case we simply take 1 + y 2 (s ? ) as the optimal debt level.
Proposition 2 below summarizes the optimal debt choice from the manager's point of view. Having identi ed the manager's preferred solution, we c a n n o w d e r i v e the corresponding comparative statics. Proof: See Appendix. 2
The most surprising result is the rst one. A theory based on entrenchment predicts an increase in leverage when the cost of nancial distress increases. The underlying logic is the following: the cost of nancial distress represents a subsidy to the raider, who, by replacing the manager, not only gets G(s), but also captures the reduction in the expected costs of nancial distress (equal to the last term in equation (8)). As a result, ceteris paribus a higher cost of nancial distress increases the pro tability o f a t a k eover. The manager's objective i s to survive at the helm of the company, so she will respond to the increased takeover pressure in the only way she has to block a takeover: increasing debt. The entrenchment approach also di ers from the e ciency one in its predictions on the e ects a change in takeover costs will have o n l e v erage. In the entrenchment approach, an increase in the takeover cost decreases the takeover pressure and, as a result, reduces the manager's need for debt. In the e ciency approach, an increase in the cost of takeovers increases the optimality of using bankruptcy as a disentrenchment device. Therefore, the e ciency approach predicts that leverage increases with the takeover cost.
The third result coincides with the comparative statics of Corollary 1. Both the e cient and the entrenchment solutions predict an increase in leverage when the replacement gain increases. One possible measure of the replacement gain is the di erential performance with respect to the industry mean: the lower the relative performance (for instance, pro tability) the higher the replacement gain. Under both regimes, thus, more pro table companies should be less highly leveraged. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the negative relationship between leverage and pro tability is one of the most widely established empirical correlations (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995) .
A comparison between the two solutions
The e cient and the entrenchment c hoices of debt di er not only in their sensitivity to certain parameters, but in their optimal levels as well. Let's use as a benchmark the shareholders' optimal solution (which happens to be also the socially e cient one):
Proposition 3 Underleverage arises when the takeover pressure does not exist (i.e., c > G (s)), or it is not strong enough to induce the manager to the optimal leverage (i.e., c > S( G(s) +y 2 (s))). These cases are likely to happen when the takeover cost is high or when the incumbent manager has a high relative performance. Overleverage occurs when the takeover pressure is so strong that it forces the manager to lever up beyond the e cient l e v el (i.e., c < S( G(s) +y 2 (s))), or when takeovers are cheaper than debt as a disentrenchment device and the manager uses risky debt to block the takeover. The rst reason for overleverage is similar to the rationale behind the use of a scorched earth strategy as an antitakeover device. The second one is more original and it is directly related to the agency problem in the choice of the appropriate disentrenchment instrument. The manager chooses debt even if this is a more ine cient d i s e n trenchment device, because it allows her to stay i n c o n trol in some states of nature. The initial shareholders understand the tax bene ts of debt, and they will maximize the value of the rm plus the value of the debt tax shield. As we s h o w in the appendix, the solution of this program delivers standard results on the e ects of taxes.
Corollary 3 The optimal leverage from the initial shareholders' perspective increases whenever a tax subsidy for debt is introduced.
To derive the manager's optimal debt in a world with taxes we r s t h a ve t o s h o w h o w t h e introduction of taxes changes the value of the company for the raiders. Then we proceed as before, looking for the minimum level of debt that makes the takeover unpro table.
4.1.1 The optimal trade-o between tax bene ts and nancial distress in the absence of agency costs
After the takeover, the best manager will be running the company and the raider sets the capital structure by w eighting the tax bene t of debt and the cost of nancial distress. In other words, when the agency problem has been resolved, our model collapses to the traditional trade-o theory of capital structure.
Lemma 4 Proof: See Appendix. 2
We a r e n o w ready to discuss the e ects of a tax subsidy for debt on the manager's capital structure choice. We divide the analysis into two cases. First we consider a manager who, in the absence of the tax subsidy, is insulated from the market for corporate control. Then we look at a manager who is under takeover pressure even in the absence of a tax subsidy for debt.
4.1.2 The e ects of a tax subsidy when the takeover pressure is low Suppose that, in the absence of taxes, the manager is insulated from the market for corporate control (i.e. G(s) < c ). We shall argue that, in this case, there exists a cut-o that determines whether the tax subsidy will have a n y e ect. If the tax subsidy is below this cut-o , then the manager will be isolated from the takeover pressure even under the pre-existing capital structure with only riskless debt. By contrast, if the tax subsidy is above the cut-o , the manager is then forced to lever up to a risky level of debt.
To compute this cut-o it is su cient to compare the value of equity before and after a takeover in the presence of a tax subsidy for debt. In the absence of a takeover, the equity value of the rm having the highest possible level of riskless debt outstanding D T is 
Equation (16) tells us that in the presence of taxes the raider not only captures the replacement gain (G(s)), but also the optimal tax bene t of leverage, that the incumbent manager was not fully exploiting for fear of her personal costs in bankruptcy. The second term precisely represents the gain from optimally levering up the company, w h i c h is formed by the increase in tax savings less the expected cost of nancial distress. Let's de ne as R(t G(s)) this net tax bene t of debt. Thus, the takeover is pro table if and only if
Note that R(t 0 G (s)) = tG(s) 1;t > 0. Hence, the expected gain from the optimal debt, R(t D T G (s)), must be strictly positive. In fact, the following proposition proves that for each c, , a n d G(s) there exists a level of tax subsidy,t(c G(s)), such that the manager otherwise isolated from the corporate control pressure is forced to issue risky debt if and only 10 The maximum safe debt can be obtained as follows. The face value of the debt, D, m ust be equal to the rm's cash-ow in the worst state of nature. We can divide this cash-ow i n t wo components. The rst one is the cash-ow in the absence of the tax subsidy: + y2(s), which is equal to y2(s) i n t h e w orst state of nature ( = 0). The second component is the tax subsidy, w h i c h i s e q u a l t o tD when the debt is safe. Therefore the maximum safe debt D solves D = y2(s) + tD ) D = y 2 (s) 1;t . 11 Note that a raider fully internalizes the company ' s d e b t v alue because she bears any cost of bankruptcy through the interest rate. Therefore, she has the correct incentives to choose the debt level that optimally trades-o tax bene ts and bankruptcy costs.
if t t (c G(s)).
Proposition 4 Suppose that G(s) < c . F or any takeover cost, replacement gain, and cost of nancial distress there exists a tax subsidy for debt,t(c G(s)) 2 (0 1 ; G(s) c ), such that a takeover of a company with no risky debt is pro table if and only if t t (c G(s)). M o r eover, t(c G(s)) increases with c and and decreases with G(s).
Proof: See Appendix 2
The comparative statics of Proposition (4) is quite intuitive. The cut-o ,t(c G(s)), increases with c because it is easier to block a costlier takeover. Likewise, an increase in reduces the pro ts from levering up the company. Since riskless debt does not allow t h e incumbent to default, the increased cost of nancial distress hurts only the raider. Finally, a n increase in the replacement gain, G(s), increases the pro tability o f a t a k eover. Therefore, a lower tax bene t is needed to induce a takeover.
Proposition (4) may shed some light on the recent c hanges in the leverage of Corporate America. In the 1980s, nancial innovations like junk bonds signi cantly decreased the costs of a hostile takeover. In our model, this would be equivalent to a decrease in c and, consequently, oft(c G(s)). Our conjecture is that this drop in c pushed the actual tax subsidy beyond t(c G(s)) for many rms, forcing managers to increase leverage. On the other hand, antitakeover legislation in the late 1980s increased c and, thus,t(c G(s)). As a result, the actual tax subsidy went belowt(c G(s)), and managers felt free to delever their companies. This might explain why Corporate America delevered under the same tax structure that generated the \overleverage" of the 1980s.
The e ects of a tax subsidy when the takeover pressure is high
We n o w study the e ects of a tax subsidy for debt in the case that a takeover is pro table in the absence of any risky debt (i.e., G(s) c).
In this case the e ect of the tax subsidy for debt is more ambiguous. In fact, the tax subsidy adds a new source of pro ts to takeovers only if it is optimal for the raider to increase leverage beyond the level chosen by the manager. manager to lever up.
By contrast, when the incumbent manager is more highly leveraged than the raider would like to be, then the tax subsidy for debt decreases the takeover gains. Partially liberated from the takeover pressure, the incumbent manager can then a ord to decrease the leverage. As a result, the introduction of a tax subsidy for debt will have the counterintuitive e ect of decreasing the leverage of highly levered rms.
Tax subsidy for equity
In the previous subsection we s h o wed that a su ciently large subsidy for debt may force an otherwise entrenched manager to lever up. In this subsection we show that a tax subsidy for equity fails to induce the manager to decrease the leverage. Indeed, it can actually force her to increase leverage.
Consider a manager who would be fully entrenched in a tax neutral economy, that is G(s) < c . N o w, introduce a subsidy that pays a percentage t on a rm's equity v alue. If the manager stays with an all equity capital structure, then the rm's value under her control becomes (1 + t)(E y 1 ( )] + y 2 (s)).
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On the other hand, if the raider takes over the rm the equity v alue is (1 + t)(E y 1 ( )] + y 2 (s ? )). As usual, a takeover is pro table if and only if the increase in equity v alue is larger than the takeover cost, that is (1 + t)G(s) c:
If (1 + t)G(s) < c , then the manager is still insulated from the market for corporate control despite the tax subsidy for equity, a n d s h e s t a ys with an all equity capital structure.
If (1 + t)G(s) c, then the tax subsidy for equity m a k es a takeover pro table under an all equity capital structure. The manager is forced to lever up. Now consider the case where the manager is not entrenched in the absence of the subsidy, that is G(s) > c . Here, one could conjecture that the tax subsidy for equity might attenuate an overleverage. The following proposition proves that this conjecture is wrong:
13 Note that there is no reason for the manager to choose a riskless debt level di erent from zero because the all equity capital structure maximizes rm's value under the incumbent's control and minimizes the probability of bankruptcy.
Proposition 5 The introduction of a tax subsidy for equity increases the manager's optimal level of leverage.
The intuition is straightforward. The manager under a takeover pressure chooses the minimum debt that blocks a takeover. The introduction of a tax subsidy for equity equal to t increases the potential gains from a takeover by t S(D) (i.e., the increase in the equity v alue produced by a t a k eover times the magnitude of the subsidy). Thus, after the introduction of the subsidy the manager sets a debt level that obtains
In other terms, the e ect of a tax subsidy for equity is to decrease the e ective cost of a takeover from c to c 1+t . A s w e proved in Corollary 2 this has the e ect of increasing debt. In sum, our model identi es a fundamental asymmetry in the working of tax incentives when managers are in control. While a tax subsidy for debt induces managers to increase leverage, a tax subsidy for equity has the perverse e ect of increasing rather than decreasing leverage. As a consequence, a di erential taxation of debt and equity might be designed to address an underleverage problem, but it cannot be used to address an overleverage one.
Extensions

Alternative Means of Entrenchment
In this paper we h a ve focused on the capital structure choice as an entrenchment device. However, managers can entrench themselves in a variety o f w ays. They can invest in assets that are speci c to them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) , choose an organizational structure that makes them indispensable (Novaes and Zingales, 1995) , or more simply they can introduce poison pills and antitakeover devices. The availability of these instruments might reduce or even eliminate the need for using debt as an entrenchment device. In such case, the manager would choose riskless debt, and the deviations from the shareholders' optimal capital structure would only be in the direction of underleverage.
However, there are two reasons why capital structure decisions might b e r e l e v ant e v en after these other entrenchment devices are considered. First, entrenchment devices are more powerful when their antitakeover e ects are less obvious. Whenever the con ict of interest behind a manager's decision is transparent, entrenchment decisions are likely to be stricken down by the court. By contrast, when the decision that entrenches the manager is a pure business decision (as nancing is), the business judgment rule applies, that is, the court does not interfere. 14 Furthermore, entrenchment devices do not come without costs and limits. If { for example { the choice of manager-speci c assets introduces large ine ciencies, the overall e ect on the likelihood of a takeover can be counterproductive.
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In sum, if no instrument alone can completely isolate the manager, multiple ways of entrenching can be complementary rather than substitutes in reaching the manager's nal goal.
The market for corporate control is not perfectly competitive
Thus far we h a ve assumed that the corporate control market is perfectly competitive and that there is no free riding. Under these assumptions, the necessary and su cient condition for takeovers to occur is S ? ; S c. In this section we relax these assumptions.
As an alternative w e assume that the raider can capture only a fraction of the equity gains that a takeover generates. This formulation captures two possible deviations from the benchmark case. The rst one is that existing shareholders can free ride, but the raider is allowed to dilute a fraction of the e ciency gains. Alternatively, represents the fraction of gains a raider can get in a bargaining with the incumbent management.
From the manager's perspective the required change is minor. Takeovers will occur whenever S(D) c: (18) The manager's optimal solution picks the minimum level of debt such that S(D) < c .
14 For instance, in the recent controversy about the excessive cash holding (low l e v erage) chosen by Chrysler's management, the Wall Street Journal (September 15, 1995) reports the following opinion of an analyst: \We are talking about subtleties and legitimate di erences of opinion on how aggressively you run the company. I don't know if that's enough to change control".
15 For an analysis of the consequences of this trade-o on a manager's ability to remain in power see Novaes and Zingales, (1995). However, this corresponds to the results obtained in Proposition 2, with a cost of takeover of c > c . In other words, the previous analysis carries through, and this renormalization has the e ect of increasing the takeover costs.
By contrast, from the initial shareholders' perspective the assumption of a non competitive market modi es the cost of using takeovers as a disentrenchment device. The cost is no longer c, but is now S(D). An interesting aspect of this modi cation is that the cost of a takeover depends on the company's leverage. Previously, the initial shareholders were only interested in nding the least costly disentrenchment device. Now they should also care about minimizing the surplus of a potential raider. In other terms, we h a ve superimposed to the framework of section 2 a surplus extraction problem similar to the one described in Israel (1991) .
This change has no consequences if C D o c. In this case the initial shareholders would prefer debt as a disentrenchment device even if they could extract all the raider's surplus. Therefore, the solution will still be D = G(s) + y 2 (s). However, the joint use of takeovers and debt may be the best alternative when C D o > c . In this case, the initial shareholders would like t o i n troduce risky debt to extract some of the takeover gains.
Note that if the initial shareholders were only interested in minimizing the raider's surplus, then their solution would be almost equal to the manager's solution. The initial shareholders would choose S(D) = c, still leaving an incentive for the raider to take o ver, while the managers would choose a slightly larger debt ( S(D) = c; ) t o m a k e sure that the takeover would not happen. However, the initial shareholders are also concerned with the cost of nancial distress. Therefore, shareholders' solution should favor less debt in the capital structure than the manager's solution.
In sum, relaxing the assumption that the market for corporate control is perfectly competitive has no substantial e ect on the manager's solution and it has the e ect of pushing the initial shareholders' solution closer to the manager's one.
Stochastic takeover costs
In our model takeovers never happen in equilibrium because the manager always prefers default rather than being ousted by a takeover. However, this unrealistic feature is a mere consequence of the assumption that the cost of a takeover is perfectly known by the manager at the time of the leverage decision. By introducing some uncertainty on the takeover cost we obtain a trade-o between the probability o f a t a k eover and the probability of bankruptcy. With this extension, takeovers and bankruptcies can both occur in equilibrium. In this subsection, we sketch this result.
We assume that the takeover cost c can take t wo v alues c and c, with c > c . With probability p > 0, takeover costs are high, c = c, while with probability 1 ;p the takeover cost is low, c = c.
We assume G(s) c and G(s) c. Hence the manager may be fully entrenched under a high takeover cost but not when the takeover cost is low. Moreover, we assume that the takeover can be blocked by a debt level that the incumbent can pay in some state of nature when the takeover cost is high.
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Although we assume that the takeover cost is not contractible, it is useful for expositional purposes to derive the capital structure that a manager would like to set had she had the ability to write a debt contract whose face value depends on the takeover cost.
The debt level that minimizes the probability of bankruptcy and blocks the takeover for a given c is the optimal debt derived in Proposition 2. Calling D(c) the optimal debt contingent on c, Corollary 2 allows us to write D(c) > D ( c).
Given that the manager cannot issue debt contingent o n c, the optimal debt strategy (from the manager's perspective) is either to block the takeover for any c or to block it only when the takeover cost is high. The choice between these two strategies depends on a trade-o between the probability of bankruptcy and the probability of a strong takeover pressure (low c).
Consistent with what we h a ve assumed so far, the manager wants to remain in power as long as possible. Therefore, we s a y that the manager's utility is 1 if she is not replaced and The above condition is satis ed when the probability of a high takeover cost is larger than the ratio between the probability o f a voiding bankruptcy respectively under a high and a low debt level. In such a case there is a positive probability of takeover even when the manager issues risky debt.
6 The E ciency versus the Entrenchment Approach Since Grossman and Hart (1982) a large body of literature derives predictions on the rm's nancing decisions by adopting an ex ante-e ciency perspective. While this approach i s generally cast in terms of an initial entrepreneur who seeks to maximize her rm's value, the conjecture is that its predictions are valid whenever an (unmodeled) outside pressure forces managers to choose a value maximizing debt level.
The most natural candidate to generate such a pressure is the corporate control market. Our model, however, shows that, depending on a company's relative performance and on the pressure from the corporate control market, the manager may underlever or overlever her company with respect to the e cient l e v el. More importantly, the two c hoices di er not only in their predicted levels, but also in their sensitivities to taxes and costs of nancial distress. For instance, while the e ciency approach predicts leverage to be positively related to the tax advantage of debt and negatively related to the tax advantage of equity, the entrenchment approach predicts an asymmetric and variable sensitivity of capital structure to tax incentives. Moreover, the sensitivity of leverage to tax subsidies is not constant through time and across companies, but is a function of a company's relative performance and the strength of the pressure from the corporate control market. Similarly, while the e ciency approach predicts a negative correlation between debt and costs of nancial distress, the entrenchment approach predicts a positive one.
In sum, our analysis shows that the corporate control market is not su cient to guarantee that managers would make v alue maximizing capital structure decisions. This result, though, does not necessarily rule out the implications derived using the value maximizing approach. These might still hold if we accept one of the following two assumptions.
Capital structure choices might be e cient because they are chosen by the initial founders. This literal interpretation, though, requires that the initial founder be able to choose, once and for all, the optimal level of debt, either by specifying an entire menu of state contingent nancial policies or by designing a system of incentives that will induce future management t o m a k e value maximizing choices. Corporate charters, howeve r , d o n o t c o n tain such complex state contingent provisions about future nancial policies. Similarly, the evidence about managerial incentive c o n tracts (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990) suggests that managers' incentives are not well aligned with value maximization.
Alternatively, one could argue that there are other outside forces { like product market competition { that induce the management t o m a k e v alue maximizing choices. A priori it is not obvious to us why these forces should work very di erently from takeover pressure, and thus why they shouldn't generate the same distortions we pointed out in this latter case. We think that identifying these forces and understanding their working is an important s t e p f o r future research.
At the current stage of knowledge, though, the managerial entrenchment approach t o capital structure choice is a clearly credible alternative. Such a position is hardly new { it was strongly advocated by Donaldson (1969) more than twenty v e y ears ago {, but it has not received due attention in the literature. It has generally been identi ed with the simple idea that managers underlever their companies for fear of the personal costs of bankruptcy. This simple risk aversion explanation, however, is incapable of explaining why managers are reluctant to issue equity (Donaldson, 1961) and why the same risk-averse managers chose to undertake major leverage recapitalization in the 1980s.
By contrast, in what follows we show that our formulation of the entrenchment approach provides a complete alternative to the e ciency approach, which is consistent with the major stylized facts on rms' nancing choices and is able to explain other important dimensions of capital structure decisions.
Equity Issues
Since Donaldson (1961) , it has been recognized that managers are reluctant to issue equity. More recently, Opler and Titman (1995) document that new equity issues are clustered after big run up in stock prices, while stock repurchases follow a decline in stock prices.
Agency-based models of capital structure are generally unable to account for the possibility of equity issues, let alone explain their patterns. All the existing models that regard debt as a discipline device fail to explain why managers do not issue equity to free themselves from this discipline. As long as the company is not bankrupt (i.e., equity has a positive value), managers can always raise new funds through an equity issue.
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Similarly, a simple risk aversion explanation is incapable of explaining why managers should not issue equity t o minimize the probability of a default. Note that the usual Myers' (1977) argument (i.e., in the presence of a debt overhang existing shareholders are hurt by an equity issue) cannot be invoked here. If managers are more concerned about maximizing their own utility rather than shareholder's value { as agency models assume { then the loss incurred by existing shareholders should not be able to stop them from issuing equity t o a void a default. entrenchment model not only is robust to managers' ability to issue equity, but is also able to explain the timing of this decision.
First, the manager's optimal leverage, which w e d e r i v ed in Proposition 2, remains unchanged if we i n troduce the possibility managers can issue equity. In fact, in that proposition the face value of debt D is de ned net of any possible cash on hand. An equity issue, then, can be interpreted as an increase in the amount of cash on hand and, thus, as a decrease in the debt level D. In other terms, our model explains why managers do not want to issue equity to free themselves from the discipline of debt even when they are allowed to do so. By issuing equity a manager would increase the pro tability and, hence, the probability of a takeover. The same threat that forced her to leverage up, prevents her to issue equity. Therefore, our model is consistent with the fact, rst observed by Donaldson (1961) , that managers generally do not issue equity e v en if they can do so.
Second, the comparative statics derived in Corollary 2 provides some implications on when a rm is likely to issue equity and when to repurchase it. Suppose that a shock m a k es the incumbent manager especially valuable for the company. This represents good news for the company, which will experience a rise in stock price, but an even better news for the manager, who will become more entrenched thanks to the reduction in the replacement gains G(s). The decrease in G(s) reduces the debt level necessary to block a t a k eover. As a result, the incumbent manager { partially freed by the fear of a takeover { will want to deleverage the company b y issuing equity in order to reduce the probability of a default. By contrast, when the replacement gains increase (and stock prices decline), the incumbent manager has to increase leverage (repurchase equity) to thwart a takeover. Therefore, our model is able to explain why equity issues are clustered after a big run up in stock prices, while stock repurchases follow a decline in stock prices (see Opler and Titman, 1995). 19 Corollary 2 also links equity issues (repurchases) to a change in the costs of takeovers: when takeover costs decrease, the incumbent manager would like to increase leverage to thwart a considered in the leverage decision 19 Of course, an alternative explanation of this phenomenon is that managers try to exploit a market deviation from fundamentals. Our model allows to test these two alternatives. Mispricing is more likely to be an industry phenomenon and, thus, equity issues should more sensitive to industry-wide movements in stock prices. By contrast, changes in the replacement gains are more likely an idiosyncratic factor, and , thus, equity i s s u e s should be more sensitive to the industry-adjusted changes in stock prices. takeover and may d o t h a t b y repurchasing stock. On the other hand, when takeover costs increase, the takeover threat becomes weaker and the manager can reduce leverage by issuing equity. These predictions are consistent with the wave o f s t o c k repurchases in the mid-late 1980s (when the introduction of junk bonds reduced the takeovers costs) and with the wave of equity issues in the early 1990s, following the demise of hostile takeovers.
The E ect of Taxes
In the e ciency approach it is di cult to explain why rms have s u c h a small response to the tax advantage to debt. Myers (1984) claims that he does not know o f a n y strong evidence in favor of a tax e ect. Since then, some evidence in favor of a tax e ect have b e e n produced (e.g., Mackie-Mason (1991) and Graham (1995) ). Nevertheless, the capital structure of companies like American Home Product still de es any e ciency rationale. At the time of the case (Mullins, 1981) , AHP was a well diversi ed drug company w i t h v ery little R&D, very stable cash ow, and a very strong balance sheet (cash balance equal to 40% of net worth). No reasonable costs of nancial distress can o set the tax advantage of at least some debt. Nevertheless, AHP was virtually debt free.
By contrast, our entrenchment model can easily account for such cases. As we h a ve shown in section 4.1, companies will di er in their sensitivity to taxes as function of the intensity of outside pressure. For a given takeover cost, the better an incumbent manager is, the less she would be threatened by a t a k eover and feel compelled to increase debt in response to a tax advantage. In other words, it is exactly its strong record of pro tability that isolates AHP from a possible takeover and makes it insensitive to a tax subsidy for debt.
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It is also consistent with our model the fact that AHP overruled its no debt policy in 1994, precisely when it was rumored to be a potential takeover target (Wall Street Journal, August, 3 1994).
The Private versus Public Debt Choice
Our entrenchment model also provides an alternative theory of the choice of the number of creditors. Bolton and Scharfstein (1992) study the ex ante optimal number of creditors from the point of view of initial shareholders. However, managers can easily change the composition of their liabilities. Therefore, it is interesting to derive a theory of the dispersion of debt claims from a manager's point of view.
Managers have a bias toward public debt because if a raider can easily renegotiate a rm's debt with its creditors, then the manager will never escape a takeover by increasing leverage. Every time an excessive level of debt blocks a takeover, a raider could obtain a concession from debtholders to pay for the takeover cost. Now, assume that the dispersion of creditors increases the raider's cost of renegotiating with creditors before a takeover. Then, the incumbent managers who issue debt to protect themselves against a takeover will prefer to distribute it among dispersed investors, so as to prevent the raider from renegotiating the debt. Thus, our model predicts that rms facing a takeover threat (i.e., rms issuing risky debt) should prefer to issue public rather than priva t e d e b t o r t o e x c hange their existing private debt for public ones. To t h i s r e g a r d i t i s i n teresting to note that while corporate bonds represented just 25% of the debt nancing of non nancial corporations in 1979 { when hostile takeovers were very rare, they became 50% of the total in 1988, at the peak of the takeover activity (see Gertler and Hubbard, 1990) .
Note also that the manager's choice of public debt in our model is purely self-interested, because the dispersion of creditors will increase the costs of renegotiation in nancial distress, thus reducing the value of equity. Therefore, our model predicts that rms exchanging private for public debt should experience a reduction in the price of their stock. This is, indeed, what Gilson and Warner (1995) nd, analyzing a sample of junk bond issuers. More interestingly, they nd { consistent with our theory { that the abnormal return associated to the announcement of a debt exchange is negative only in the early-mid 1980s, when hostile takeovers were more likely and, thus, entrenchment w as the more likely cause of that decision.
Other Aspects of Corporate Debt
There are other features of corporate debt that might increase the e ectiveness of debt as an antitakeover device. For instance, if existing debtholders can be diluted by a leverage recapitalization undertaken by a raider, then debt has no e ect in deterring a takeover, and it may actually provide a subsidy for a takeover. For this reason, it is in the interest of the manager to write covenants that protect debtholders against the possible dilution produced by subsequent debt issues. Such a c o venant should require an acquirer to pay d o wn all the existing debt in case of an acquisition. This type of covenant, quite common in the 1980s, is called a \poison put". The very name indicates the antitakeover purpose of this covenant.
An alternative w ay to protect public debtholders would be to make them senior. However, recall that the less risky public debt is, the less it serves the purpose of an antitakeover device. Therefore, it is in the interest of the manager to make the public debt junior (and so more risky), transforming the bondholders into the recipients of part of the takeover gains. By contrast, bank debt, which tends to be more concentrated, can well be made senior. In short, the entrenchment approach p r o vides an explanation for the seniority structure of debt that is quite di erent from the existing e ciency-based arguments (see Rajan and Winton, 1995, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1995) .
Conclusions
In this paper we construct a framework that enables us to analyze various dimensions of capital structure decisions under two alternative approaches: e ciency and entrenchment. We show that a pressure from the corporate control market is not enough to guarantee that managers' nancing decisions coincide with the value maximizing ones. The predictions di er not only in the level of the optimal capital structure, but also in the sensitivities of debt to the cost of nancial distress and taxes. These results raise two important questions for future research. First, from a theoretical point of view it would be interesting to discover whether there are other forces, like product market competition or the need for new nancing, that induce managers to choose a value maximizing level of debt. Second, from an empirical point of view, it would be interesting to establish whether actual nancing decisions are more consistent with the e ciency or the entrenchment approach. To this extent, a contribution of our model is to derive a set of testable implications that might help distinguish empirically between the two theories.
Discerning the correct approach to explaining rms' nancing decisions has very important policy implications. For instance, if capital structure is chosen by shareholders to maximize the rm's value, then it is well known that any di erential treatment in the taxation of debt and equity is distortionary. But if capital structure is chosen by managers in their own self interest, then a tax-advantage for debt might b e w elfare enhancing. We hope that our model might p r o vide a conceptual framework to guide empirical research on this important topic. where V ( D) is the rm's value net of the debt tax shield tB( D t ) (which is given by the tax rate times the market value of the debt), and D is the worst state in which the rm can fully pay a debt with face value D. Then, if we i n troduce a tax subsidy for equity w e can write (thanks to the rst part of the proof) the equity gain from a takeover as S(D) + t S(D). But before the introduction of the tax subsidy for equity the manager chose the level of debt so that S(D) = c. Therefore, after the introduction of the tax subsidy the raider's pro t will be equal to c + t S(D) > c . As a result, the manager, will be forced to setD so that (1 + t) S(D) = c. Given that S(D) decreases with D, w e h a veD > D . 2
